Many jurisdictions have considered relaxing Sunday alcohol sales restrictions, yet such restrictions' effects on public health remain poorly understood. This paper analyzes the effects of legalization of Sunday packaged liquor sales on crime, focusing on the phased introduction of such sales in Virginia beginning in 2004. Differences-in-differences and triple-differences estimates indicate the liberalization increased minor crime by 5% and alcoholinvolved serious crime by 10%. The law change did not affect domestic crime or induce significant geographic or inter-temporal crime displacement. The costs of this additional crime are comparable to the state's revenues from increased liquor sales.
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is a registered trademark. Miller et al. (2006) estimate the annual cost of crimes attributable to alcohol at $84 billion, while Greenfeld (1998) estimates that nationally more than 3 million violent crimes are committed each year in which the offender is likely to have used alcohol, and alcohol is a factor in two- This paper uses detailed crime incident data surrounding a period in which Virginia relaxed Sunday sales restrictions in certain jurisdictions to estimate the causal effect of laws restricting Sunday packaged liquor purchases on crime. Employing a difference-in-differences and triple-differences methodology to control for confounding factors affecting crime rates, I
I. Introduction
demonstrate that the Sunday sales repeal led to a 5% increase in lower-level property and public order crime and an 10% percent increase in alcohol-involved serious crime. As expected, these effects are concentrated among crime types and locations that are most plausibly affected by alcohol policy, and the results are robust to the use of alternative samples and statistical specifications. A simple cost analysis suggests that the monetized social cost of the additional crime generated by the repeal roughly equals the revenue generated for the state from additional liquor sales.
Section 2 of the paper selectively reviews prior work examining links between alcohol availability and crime. Existing research provides ambiguous guidance regarding the expected effect of Sunday sales restrictions on crime. Section 3 describes the policy experiment that occurred in Virginia and outlines the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the differences-in-differences and triple-differences approaches used to measure the effects of the law change. Section 5 reports the primary results, including a series of robustness checks.
Section 6 presents the cost analysis, and Section 7 concludes.
II. Why Might Sunday Liquor Laws Impact Crime?
There is a robust body of evidence linking general availability of alcohol to crime. This literature would seem to suggest that policies that restrict alcohol availability such as Sunday sales restrictions might lower crime. At the same time, the applicability of existing research to Sunday liquor laws remains unclear given that these laws likely have different effects on alcohol consumption and associated routine activities than other commonly used proxies for availability, such as taxes or outlet density.
Numerous individual-level studies demonstrate a correlation between measures of alcohol availability and crime. 1 Saffer (2001) demonstrates that self-reported arrest and property crime are lower in states with higher alcohol taxes. Using data from the Monitoring the Future Study, Markowitz (2001) documents a similar relationship between alcohol and violence. Using an innovative regression discontinuity design, Carpenter and Dobkin (2008) show that both alcohol consumption and violent arrests increase substantially just after individuals attain the legal drinking age.
Research has also demonstrated a relationship between alcohol availability and crime on a community and state level. Using UCR data from 1979 -1987 , Cook and Moore (1993 demonstrate that state-level alcohol consumption is associated with increases in assaults, rape, and burglary. They also demonstrate that increased alcohol taxes are associated with decreases in rape and robbery. Sloan et al. (1994) and Berman et al. (2000) show an inverse relation between jurisdictional alcohol regulation and homicide. Speer et al. (1998) Family Violence Survey, Markowitz (2000) demonstrates that female-directed domestic violence is lower in areas with high alcohol prices, her proxy for availability. Markowitz and Grossman (2000) similarly demonstrate a negative relationship between alcohol prices and child abuse.
Although the correlational evidence suggests expanded availability might increase crime, the role of many specific alcohol control measures remain poorly understood. Moreover, even for policies that have been more extensively studied, such as zoning laws, there exist few credible estimates of causal policy effects. 2 In the specific case of Sunday sales restrictions, the theoretical links between the policy and crime are particularly murky.
Several lines of reasoning suggest the repeal of a selective liquor restriction would be unlikely to affect crime. Perhaps the strongest argument against a significant effect is the fact that packaged liquor purchased on Sundays in highly substitutable with other forms of alcohol.
Liquor is readily storable, so individuals wishing to consume packaged liquor on Sundays can easily purchase it on other days of the week and then consume during periods when sales are restricted. The sales ban affects packaged liquor but does not affect packaged beverages with lower alcohol content, such as beer, nor does it affect liquor sold by the glass in restaurants.
These products are likely close substitutes for packaged liquor. Finally, residents near Maryland and Kentucky can also cross the border and purchased packaged liquor on Sundays in selected jurisdictions in those states. The seemingly high degree of intertemporal, geographic, and product substitutability for packaged liquor purchased on Sundays argues against a large effect of the repeal of the ban on consumption or associated harms.
However, some existing scholarly work does offer evidence suggesting the repeal of these laws might have a less benign effect. Olsson and Wikström (1982) Carpenter (2007) , and the minimum legal drinking age, analyzed in Carpenter and Dobkin (2008) . 3 The findings of this study contributed to a decision to close Swedish monopoly stores on Saturdays beginning in 1982. However, in 2000 Saturday sales were re-introduced in two phases, and the effects of the re-introduction were evaluated in Norstrom and Skog (2003, 2005) . They found no evidence of increases in assaults following the opening of stores on Saturdays.
sales in Ontario, Canada and find that the repeal did not increase overall alcohol consumption but did increase Sunday consumption. 4 Grunewald et al. (2006) demonstrate that the density of offpremises alcohol outlets is more strongly correlated with crime patterns than restaurants or bars.
Although this evidence is only correlational in nature, it suggests the possibility that displacement of alcohol from consumption in bars or restaurants to consumption in other locations might affect crime even absent an increase in overall consumption. More broadly, there is a growing literature indicating that situational factors, including those associated with alcohol use, can have important short-run effects on crime (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti 2007; Dahl and DellaVigna 2009; Rees and Schnepel 2009; Card and Dahl 2010) . Thus, existing theory and empirical work do not provide a strong basis for predicting the likely effects of repealing a Sunday liquor ban on crime.
III. Institutional Background and Data
To empirically resolve this question, I exploit a series of laws that progressively expanded the jurisdictions in which packaged liquor could be purchased on Sundays in Virginia. crimes, DUI and drunkenness are relatively prevalent, but it is also notable that a significant fraction of Group B crimes are not specifically categorized.
IV. Empirical Approach
I use differences-in-differences (DD) and triple-differences (DDD) comparisons to estimate the effect of legalizing Sunday packaged liquor sales on crime. A key empirical challenge in estimating the effect of the law is accounting for external factors, such as law enforcement 10 Specifically, I consider all non-treated jurisdictions with at least 10,000 residents that were more than 80% urban in 2000 as defined by the Census. All of the treated jurisdictions satisfy these criteria. 11 As demonstrated in Section V, my conclusions are not sensitive to this choice of control group.
practices, that may be correlated with the passage of the law and independently affect crime rates but which may be unobservable to the researcher. The differences-in-differences estimates account for such factors by using crimes on other days of the week as a control group for crimes on Sundays and crime patterns in the pre-reform period as controls for crime patterns following the reform. This approach differences away the effects of macroeconomic trends as well as any confounding factors that are shared equally across days of the week. For example, if the law change coincided with an unobserved increase in law enforcement personnel, because these personnel would likely affect enforcement on both Sundays and other days of the week, their influence would not bias the difference-in-difference estimates.
The differences-in-differences estimation approach can be implemented in a regression framework in which the unit of observation is a day within a jurisdiction. and X jt time-varying control covariates. In the regression:
The coefficient β measures the effect of legalizing Sunday liquor sales on crime. Because crime varies seasonally and across days of the week, we control for these factors using D i and M t . L i controls for time-invariant factors specific to a jurisdiction that might affect crime, such as geography. X jt includes indicators for major holidays and, in some specifications, jurisdiction specific time trends. I separately consider different types of crimes such as violent crime, property crime, alcohol-involved crime, and domestic violence as outcomes. Given the count nature of the data, I estimate (1) using Poisson regression.
14 Although the differences-in-differences approach provides a stronger research design than simple pre-post comparisons, other unobserved factors affecting time use on Sundays might possibly still explain changes in relative crime rates over time. 15 The fact that liquor sales restrictions were lifted in only a limited set of jurisdictions in Virginia provides an additional source of variation that we can exploit. In particular, in addition to conducting differences-indifferences comparisons as described above, we can include an additional difference comparing affected and unaffected jurisdictions in a triple-differences framework. This can be achieved estimating regressions of the form:
where the notation is as in equation (1) and, for example, D i ·L j denotes interactions between each jurisdiction and the day of the week. A notable feature of these regressions is that they include a full set of interactions between location and day of week, day of week and time, and location and pre/post implementation status. These interaction terms render the triple-differences analysis robust to unobserved changes in daily activity patterns that are specific to particular time periods or particular jurisdictions. For example, if additional TV advertisements for alcoholic beverages were aired on Sundays after July 2004, the differences-in-differences analysis might confound the effects of these advertisements with the effects of the law change. However, provided that the unobserved confounding factors occurred in both treated and untreated jurisdictions (which is likely true for TV advertising), the triple-differences approach removes the confounders. 
V. Results
The patterns in Figure 1 suggest that law change may have impacted some types of crime. Among Group B crimes, there is a statistically significant increase of about 18% in disorderly conduct arrests following the liquor law repeal, which seems intuitive given that disorderly conduct is often precipitated by alcohol consumption. Whether one would expect increased DUI following repeal of a ban on liquor sales seems unclear--clearly if people consume packaged liquor purchased on Sunday before driving, this would tend to increase DUI, but greater availability of packaged liquor might also encourage consumption away from bars or restaurants, which could conceivably reduce intoxicated driving. Table 2 indicates that the law change did not affect drunk driving, at least as detected by police. This finding echoes that of Lovenheim and Steefel (2010) , who find no relationship between repeal of Sunday sales bans and fatal vehicle accidents. There is also no apparent effect of the law change on liquor law 16 Because the number of groups is arguably small in the DD regressions, for these regressions I follow Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and report wild cluster-bootstrapped standard errors. For the DDD regressions I report cluster-robust standard errors with clustering at the jurisdiction level; these standard errors should be asymptotically consistent even when the Poisson assumption of equal mean and variance fails. 17 Further disaggregating into individual crimes such as rape or robbery yields no additional evidence of statistically significant impacts.
violations, although this is perhaps unsurprising given that most such violations involve the sale of alcohol to minors in bars or restaurants, a phenomenon which may not be sensitive to policies related to packaged liquor sales. A considerable fraction of the overall effect of the law change on Group B crime is attributable to uncategorized or "Other" crimes, which increased by over 7% following the repeal.
The fact that much of the increase in Group B crime occurs for the "Other" category is disadvantageous as it is unclear exactly what types of crimes are represented by this miscellaneous classification. Intuitively, we expect the effect of a liquor law change to be most pronounced for crimes which may arise as a result of alcohol misuse. Because the NIBRS Group B records do not include a separate measure of alcohol involvement, we cannot directly examine whether the "Other" Group B crimes are indeed likely to involve alcohol use.
Nevertheless, one piece of evidence strongly suggests that these crimes do indeed often involve alcohol misuse. For typical crimes in the U.S., the rate of offending is highest in the late teenage years, leading to an age-crime curve that peaks in late adolescence (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983 , Farrington 1986 , Laub and Sampson 2003 . For crimes involving the misuse of alcohol, in contrast, the age-crime curve tends to peak around age 21, because alcohol use increases substantially once individuals reach the legal drinking age. Such disparate patterns are illustrated in Figure 2 , which uses the Virginia NIBRS data to plot the age distribution of arrestees for various crimes. For property crime, the age-crime distribution follows the typical pattern, peaking prior to age 20 and declining steadily thereafter. 18 When focusing on two crimes that by definition involve alcohol consumption, DUI and public intoxication, I obtain an age-crime distribution that is right-shifted and peaks at or shortly after the minimum legal drinking age. For the "Other" Group B crimes, the age-crime distribution peaks at age 21 and more closely resembles the distribution of alcohol-involved crimes rather than more general types of crime. Thus, the age-crime pattern for the "Other" Group B crimes strongly suggests that these crimes do indeed frequently involve the misuse of alcohol.
Although Table 2 suggests that overall and specific categories of Group A crime were not affected by the repeal, it is nevertheless possible that certain more specific types of Group A crime were affected. If the increase in alcohol-involved Group A crimes truly results from the expansion of packaged liquor sales on Sundays, we would probably expect the resulting crimes to occur during periods of the day when packaged liquor was available for purchase or consumption.
Because Virginia ABC stores do not open until 1 p.m., increases in crime that occur prior to this hour seem unlikely to represent effects of the policy change. Figure 3 plots coefficients from DDD models in which the outcome is crime committed within specific three-hour windows on Sundays. To facilitate comparison of coefficient magnitudes across hours of the day, these models are estimated using OLS. 20 Relative to the control jurisdictions, Sunday crime in the treatment jurisdictions is quite similar prior to 1 p.m., with no evidence of statistically significant differences, but crime differences rise beginning in the early afternoon, reaching a peak between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m., when alcohol consumption tends to be higher. The timing of the shift in crime is consistent with a crime effect arising from alcohol availability rather than other factors.
We would also probably expect the crimes resulting from an increase in packaged liquor sales to occur in homes or on the road rather than in places such as bars or restaurants. In unreported regressions I estimated the impact of the repeal on crimes committed in specific locations. Although the resulting estimates were insufficiently precise to draw strong conclusions, the largest point estimates were observed for crime committed around residences, parking lots, and roads. There was no evidence of a change in Sunday Group A crime occurring in bars and restaurants or grocery and convenience stores following the law change. 20 Because the OLS DD and DDD estimates essentially involve comparisons of means across different groupings of the data and the number of observations underlying each mean are substantial, from various laws of large numbers we would expect even OLS to deliver consistent estimates of the effects of the law under a variety of datagenerating processes. Table 4 re-examines the results using all jurisdictions in Virginia as the comparison group. Broadening the set of comparison geographies yields coefficients that are similar in magnitude and significance to the baseline.
The fact that jurisdictions that experienced repeal are clustered together geographically (Appendix Figure 1 ) might raise concerns regarding the appropriateness of approaching each affected jurisdiction as though it was independently treated. In Specification 3, I aggregate the data into three synthetic jurisdictions--early legalizers, later legalizers, and the rest of the state--and conduct the DDD analysis using only these three groups. Estimated impacts are quite similar to the baseline in both magnitude and significance.
Specification 4 uses a negative binomial model rather than a Poisson model to estimate the effects of the repeal. Estimated effects on total crime and total Group B crime become only marginally significant, but these point estimates are of comparable magnitude to the baseline, and effects on disorderly conduct and alcohol-involved Group A crime remain positive and significant. Specification 5 uses OLS rather than a count model and obtains equivalent results.
In Specification 6, I include a set of locality-specific quadratic time trends as additional controls; these controls more fully account for the possibility that crime patterns over time might vary across jurisdictions in ways correlated with treatment. Because the basic identification approach contrasts crime across days of the week, one would not expect such trends, if they occur, to confound the estimates, and indeed controlling for additional time trends changes the estimates very little.
Although it seems most sensible to associate crimes occurring in the early morning with alcohol exposure on the prior day, specification 7 replicates the estimates defining the day using the traditional 24-hour period from 12 AM to 12 PM. 21 Effects on alcohol-involved Group A crime decline slightly to 8.6%, but remain statistically significant. The next specifications of Table 4 report results of two falsification tests designed to examine the robustness of the triple-differences identification strategy. In the first falsification test (specification 12), I use crime occurring on Thursday rather than on Sunday as an outcome.
Because crime displacement between Sundays and Thursdays is unlikely, if the triple-differences approach appropriately controls for unobserved differences across time and across jurisdictions, one should not expect to observe statistically significant effects on Thursday crime. Indeed, for this specification the point estimates are practically small and none is statistically significant, suggesting the DDD methodology may effectively account for confounding factors.
In the final row of Table 4 I test for the possibility that there were changes in enforcement associated with the law change. If police leaders believed that the additional availability of liquor would result in public disorder or unsafe driving, they may have increased the number of officers working Sunday shifts or otherwise shifted resources in an effort to respond to the policy. In this case, the increase in crime observed following the repeal might simply represent an increase in enforcement rather than a true change in the underlying amount of criminal activity. Although it seems doubtful to think that police leaders in most jurisdictions
were closely attuned to current policies governing the availability of alcohol, enforcement adjustments could at least in theory explain some of my results.
Although I lack direct measures of enforcement effort, I am able to observe the share of reported crime incidents that resulted in arrest, which provides one proxy for the level of enforcement. Past research (e.g. Mas 2006 ) has demonstrated a correlation between enforcement inputs and the arrest/clearance rate. Specification 13 reports the law change coefficient from an OLS regression where the outcome is the share of Group A crime incidents in a particular day/jurisdiction that were ultimately were resolved with an arrest (mean=.275). The coefficient thus measures the extent to which the arrest probability changed for incidents occurring on Sundays in affected jurisdictions following the law change. Given many arrests are on-view arrests that occur when officers encounter criminal activity as a part of normal patrol duties, it seems plausible to expect that an increase in enforcement would be manifest in a higher arrest rate. However, the table demonstrates that there was almost no change in Sunday arrest rates following the law change, and the estimated coefficient is sufficiently precise so as to rule out changes in arrest rates of more than a few percentage points. It does not appear that these results can be explained primarily by changes in enforcement.
Although the robustness checks confirm that the repeal increased certain types of crime on Sunday, it is possible that this change did not represent a net increase in crime, but rather displacement of crime from other days of the week or other jurisdictions to those that were treated. For example, if prior to the law change consumers anticipated that liquor would be unavailable on Sunday and therefore purchased and consumed more liquor on Saturday than they would have otherwise, the law change might have reduced Saturday consumption and associated harms, including crime. Alternatively, the law change may have shifted general activity away from neighboring jurisdictions towards the affected jurisdictions on Sunday, in which case crime might increase in affected jurisdictions due to larger population exposure but decrease in neighboring jurisdictions.
Fortunately, the available data permit direct tests of these possibilities. Table 5 reports regression coefficients from augmented versions of equation (2) Specification 2, which tests for displacement across jurisdictions, indicates that the effects of the law remain positive and significant in the affected jurisdictions under an augmented specification. Point estimates on total crime and total Group B crime in neighboring jurisdictions are negative, which would indicate displacement, although these coefficients are imprecisely estimated, precluding strong conclusions. For disorderly conduct and alcohol involved Group A crime, however, there is no evidence of geographic displacement. Overall the estimates in Table 5 suggests that the law change generated net increases in crime rather than simply displacing crime. 
VI. Cost Analysis
One natural question that arises in light of my finding that repeals of Sunday liquor sales restrictions increase crime is how the costs of this additional crime compare to the benefits of repeal. Unfortunately, a full-fledged cost-benefit analysis of the law change is infeasible, primarily due to the fact that an important benefit of the repeals is increased convenience to consumers from being able to more easily obtain packaged liquor on Sundays, but the value of this benefit to consumers remains unclear. However, given that packaged liquor sales are 23 VABC stores also sell lottery tickets. 24 Using data from prior years yields similar percentages.
A growing scholarly literature attempts to approximate the cost of representative crimes for use in policy analysis. 25 Typical crime cost calculations attempt to incorporate such factors as pain and suffering of victims, lost offender and victim productivity, property losses, and costs to the criminal justice system. As noted by Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996) , a seminal work in this area, crime cost calculations are affected by multiple sources of uncertainty, however, meaning that crime cost calculations should be treated with appropriate caution. To monetize the losses to society resulting from additional crime generated by the policy change, we require estimates of the cost of a typical Group B crime and a typical alcohol-involved Group A crime.
Cohen and Piquero (2009) per Group B crime.
26
To calculate the cost of a representative alcohol-involved Group A crime in Virginia, I
use the crime-specific cost values reported in Piquero (2009) and McCollister, French, and Fang (2010) and apply them to the actual distribution of alcohol-involved crimes by type observed in the NIBRS data for Virginia. This calculation requires assuming that alcohol- 
VII. Conclusions
Although opponents of liberalization of laws governing the availability of alcohol on Sundays argue that heightened availability will generate negative social consequences, including increasing crime, prior empirical evidence for this proposition has been limited. When focusing on specific restrictions commonly in place in the U.S., such as restrictions on off-premises versus on-premises sales or sales of beer versus liquor, the theoretical relationship between availability and crime becomes even murkier due to the potential substitutability across forms of alcohol.
This paper provides some of the first convincing evidence that expansion of Sunday alcohol sales 27 Virginia's fiscal year begins July 1, so the revenue calculations do not include the second repeal period.
can increase crime, demonstrating that the introduction of Sunday packaged liquor sales in selected jurisdictions in Virginia increased low-level property/public order crime by 5% and alcohol-involved serious crime by 10%. The timing and location of crime effects are consistent with a causal story based on alcohol availability, and the data suggest that these effects represent a net increase in crime rather than displacement across days of the week or localities. The social costs of these crimes are roughly equivalent to the state revenues generated through additional alcohol sales.
Debate over the proper level of alcohol availability, which benefits consumers, retailers, and tax authorities but which may also generate health care and crime externalities must clearly incorporate perspectives beyond the public health perspective. Nevertheless, clearly measuring the public health effects of alcohol restrictions represents a necessary pre-requisite for sensibly evaluating alcohol policy. Although the paper considers a specific form of alcohol restriction in a single state, given the widespread implementation of similar restrictions in other states its findings are likely to inform policy debates in a number of jurisdictions. Moreover, in demonstrating that alcohol sales expansions can be detrimental even when alternative means of consumption are already widely available, it provides new evidence that seemingly modest changes in alcohol policy can have important effects on public health. This fact counsels caution in the formulation of alcohol regulations, a policy domain in which even incremental changes can apparently have significant effects on local communities. 
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: This table reports coefficients from Poisson regressions where the outcome variable is the count of crimes that occurred in a locality on a specific day and the primary explanatory variable is an indicator equal to 1 when Sunday packaged liquor sales are legal. The unit of observation is a locality/day. Each table entry reports a coefficient from a separate regression. For the differences-in-differences (DD) regressions, the first difference compares crimes committed on Sunday to crimes committed on other days of the week and the second difference compares crimes committed prior to the law change to crimes committed after the law change. The sample for the DD regressions is the 15 localities affected by the law change. The DD regressions include a full set of locality fixed effects, and all specifications include indicator variables controlling for the occurrence of New Year's Day, Christmas, Easter, Valentine's Day, the Fourth of July, and the Super Bowl. The DDD regressions expand the sample to the other 20 urban localities in the state, and identify the effects of the law change using an additional comparison of affected to unaffected localities. These regressions include a full set of locality/Sunday, day-of-week/month, and locality/month interactions as additional controls. For the DD regressions, standard errors are obtained through a wild cluster bootstrap procedure with 500 iterations; see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) for further details. Unreported standard errors using traditional clustering are of very similar magnitude. For the DDD regressions, standard errors clustered on locality are reported in parentheses. * denotes an estimate that is statistically significant at the two-tailed 5% level, and ** at the 1% level. Tables 2-3 ; see notes for those tables. Specification 2 expands the analysis sample to include all jurisdictions in Virginia. Specification 3 creates three synthetic jurisdictions by aggregating across the jurisdictions that early legalizers, later legalizers, and non-legailzers. Specification 4 estimates the effects of the law change using a negative binomial rather than Poisson model. Specification 5 uses OLS rather than Poisson; raw OLS coefficients are reported in the table. Specification 6 includes a full set of locality-specific quadratic time trends as additional controls. Specification 7 measures crime timing based on a 24-hour day beginning at 12 a.m. rather than 6 a.m. Specification 8 excludes May 15-Sept. 15 from the sample. Specification 9 limits the sample to the 15 jurisdictions in which the law had been repealed by 2008. Specification 10 limits the sample to the 10 jurisdictions with legal Sunday sales as of July 1, 2004 and the control jurisdictions. Specification 11 limits the sample to the 5 jurisdictions that legalized Sunday sales in 2008 and the control jurisdictions. Specification 12 assumes that Thursday crime rather than Sunday crime was affected 
Note: This table reports triple-differences regression estimates of the effect of the repeal on crimes, allowing for the possibility of negative or positive crime spillovers from neighboring days or neighboring jurisdictions. Specification 1 measures the effects of the repeal on affected Sundays and the Saturdays and Mondays preceding and following these days. Specification 2 measures the effect of the repeal on affected jurisdictions allowing for separate impacts in neighboring jurisdictions. There are 7 neighboring jurisdictions potentially affected by the 2004 law change and 9 additional neighboring jurisdictions affected by the 2008 law change. Each specification/column reports coefficients from a unique regression. The samples includes all jurisdictions in Virginia and N=387167. See notes for Table 2 .
